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Abstract:  This essay begins by retracing the 
relationship between the early Heidegger and 
Edmund Husserl during the period when 
Heidegger’s thought was still closely aligned 
with Husserl’s phenomenological project. It 
then shows how a fundamental difference 
emerged over the question of what the ultimate 
grounds for action.  When Heidegger says that 
Husserl has failed to address the real question 
about the meaning of Being, he is referring to 
the meaning of Dasein. Whereas Husserl main-
tains that willing and action must remain 
grounded in the intention/fulfillment structure 
of reason, Heidegger comes to the view that 
Dasein must resolutely accept its calling as the 
groundless ground of significance that is ulti-
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Resumen: El presente ensayo empieza retro-
cediendo hacia la relación del Heidegger tem-
prano con Edmund Husserl, en el periodo en el 
que el pensamiento heideggeriano estaba 
todavía alineado con el proyecto fenomenológi-
co de Husserl. A continuación, se muestra 
cómo a raíz de la pregunta por el sustrato 
último de toda acción emerge una diferencia 
fundamental. Cuando Heidegger dice que Hus-
serl no ha conseguido hacer la verdadera pre-
gunta acerca del sentido del ser, se refiere al 
sentido del Dasein. Mientras Husserl mantiene 
que la voluntad y la acción tienen que perma-
necer fundamentadas en la estructura de in-
tención/cumplimiento propia de la razón, Hei-
degger llega a la postura de que Dasein tiene 
que aceptar con determinación la llamada del 
fundamento abismático del significado, la últi-
ma fuente del significado en el mundo. 
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The lecture courses Heidegger gave in Freiburg and Marburg between 1919 
and the publication of Sein und Zeit in 1927 provide a solid basis for under-
standing the influence of Husserl’s Ideen I  and Ideen II on his own work, and 
definitive confirmation that the Ideen II is one of the main texts that Heidegger 
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had in mind in the famous footnote where he thanks Husserl for “intensive per-
sonal guidance and the most generous access to unpublished investigations 
that had acquainted him with the most diverse areas of phenomenological re-
search” (SZ, 38).  Heidegger’s own account in the early lectures conveys the 
image of two fellow researchers each pursuing phenomenology as – to use 
Heidegger’s words – the “original science of life in itself” 
(“Ursprungswissenschaft vom Leben an sich”) (GA 58, p. 1) or simply  of 
“Geist” (GA 58, p. 19) not only in parallel, but also in collaboration with each 
other.  Part of the reason for Heidegger’s close identification with Husserl was 
not only the fundamental insights he had gained from Husserl ever since his 
reading of the Logische Untersuchungen that began with his university studies 
in 1909,1 but also the trajectory that Husserl’s work had taken after his en-
counter with Dilthey as articulated, for example, in the Third Part of Ideen II 
and in his lectures on “Natur und Geist”.  
Heidegger was certainly also well familiar with the Ideen I,2 but, even after 
the appearance of the Ideen I, it is the Logische Untersuchungen that he con-
siders the ground-breaking work that remains the basis for own phenomenolog-
ical investigations (see, for example, GA 63, p. 70; GA 17, pp 49-50).  He pro-
vides a positive account of both phenomenological reduction and the 
noesis/noema distinction that are important new additions introduced in the 
Ideen I as crucial elements of phenomenology, yet he also finds much there 
that is problematic and indicates that Husserl has not distanced himself as 
much from unquestioned assumptions of modern philosophy, especially Des-
cartes, as Heidegger considers necessary if phenomenology is to realize its full-
est potential.  The two key lectures in which the Ideen I are discussed explicitly 
and in some detail are the 1923-24 lecture entitled Einführung in die 
phänomenologische Forschung (GA 17) and the 1925 lecture  Prolegomena zur 
Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (GA 20).    
 
 
1As reported in his own account of his life from the Foreword to his Frühe Schriften from 1972 (GA 1, 
56). 
2 The 1914 work contains what is probably his earliest reference to Husserl’s Ideen I in a footnote to the 
section on “The Negative Judgment” (GA 1, p. 181).  Other references to the Ideas I there include a 
distinction between simpler forms of knowledge and knowledge that takes the form of a judgment (GA 1, 
pp. 268), positive appropriations of his conception of the “noematic” (GA 1, pp. 282 and 310), and a 
footnote that cites “the valuable statements by E. Husserl regard ‘pure consciousness’ [...] that provide 
a decisive insight into the richness of ‘consciousness’ [...]”. (GA 1, p. 405) – all of which show that he 
worked through the Ideas I positively and soon after it appeared. 
A FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE: HUSSERL AND HEIDEGGER ON THE GROUNDING OF ETHICS 193 
 
Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, vol. Monográfico 4/II (2013): Razón y Vida. 193 
 
In the 1923-24 course, Heidegger introduces the object of phenomenologi-
cal research by means of “Husserl’s up until now furthest developed position, 
the ‘Ideas concerning a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Research’” 
(GA 17, p. 47).  He cites Husserl’s description of phenomenology “as the de-
scriptive eidetic science of pure consciousness” (ibid., p. 139), but criticizes  
Husserl’s assumption that philosophy must be a science (ibid., pp. 79-82) and 
its overemphasis on theoretical knowledge as the model for experience as a 
whole (ibid., 82-83).  Between the earliest Freiburg lectures and this lecture in 
Marburg, Heidegger had come to see a difference between the basic direction of 
Husserl’s work and his own.  He does not see Husserl’s orientation on verifiable 
truths as helpful for the kinds of questions that are now in the foreground for 
him.  
 
One should note above all that truth, in as far as it is interpreted as validity, hides 
the decisive problems of Dasein. The question is whether for historical knowledge in 
general the interpretation of truth as validity makes any sense.  Even more ques-
tionable is it with regard to philosophical knowledge, most impossible is it in the 
case of the ‘truth’ of art and religion (ibid., p. 98).  
  
He emphasizes that “… what Husserl says about evidence is vastly superior 
to everything else that has ever been said about it and that he placed the issue 
on secure footing for the first time” (GA 17, pp. 272-73), and he acknowledges 
– without reference to the specific passages in the Ideen Ito this effect3 – “… 
that Husserl sees that each domain of objects has a specific evidence corre-
sponding to its content …” (ibid., p. 273) but adds,  
 
by contrast, the authentic question of evidence in the most fundamental sense only 
begins with the question about the specific evidence of the access to the Being and 
the disclosure of a being, of retaining and holding on to a Being that has become 
accessible.  Only within the phenomenon grasped in this way does theoretical evi-
dence have its place (ibid.).  
 
Heidegger says that the Ideas I fails to move far enough beyond the 
tendencies within modern philosophy to categorize and scientifically determine 
everything including consciousness itself.  He sees the project of determining 
 
 
3 Namely §§ 138-39 (Hua III, pp. 321-24). 
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life as the whole of experiences that are seen as individual facts instead of “un-
derstanding life itself in its authentic Being and responding to the question con-
cerning the character of its Being”  (ibid., p. 274-75) as deeply problematic.   
The fundamental character of life in its authentic Being is what he calls “tempo-
rality”, which now means above all a confrontation with one’s finitude and the 
fact that life is a performance (Vollzug) that must be understood as “call”.  Life 
is not a fact but as something that must be accomplished.  This reliance on 
facts is what Heidegger means by “validity” in the passage cited above.  The 
critique of truth as validity implies that Heidegger has now sees Husserl’s pro-
ject as hindered by his presumption the kinds of questions at stake in the truth 
of art and religion can be answered by intuitions that will provide the same kind 
of certainty and universal validity that is possible for theoretical questions.   
Heidegger’s position will eventually culminate in the famous dictum from Sein 
und Zeit that the most fundamental questions must be faced with the aware-
ness that no one and nothing can provide Dasein with the answer to the ques-
tion of the ultimate source of meaning for one’s life and that facing up to the 
essential indeterminacy of the proper response is essential for authentic Dasein.  
Hence the remarks at the end of the course where he describes the task of 
phenomenology as “explicating Dasein in its Being” (ibid., p. 278) and as “the 
exhibition (Aufweis) of Dasein itself” (ibid., p. 279).  What Heidegger calls the  
“historical” here is not a set of facts, but a point of decision.  His critique of 
Husserl, above all of the predominant tendencies still present in his work but as 
expressed already in the Ideen I, is that his orientation on reason modeled up-
on the search for knowledge is ill equipped to handle these sorts of questions.4 
His critique of these limitations is described not so much as a difference be-
tween Husserl and himself, but as a tension within Husserl’s own phenomeno-
logical project.  The countervailing tendencies that he sees as positive are ar-
ticulated in the manuscripts and lectures from Husserl during precisely this pe-
riod.  In a footnote to the essay “The Concept of Time” from 1924, Heidegger 
acknowledges the debt he owed to the method of phenomenology first laid out 
 
 
4 If one wants to try to identify a “turning point” in this gradual development, a good candidate would be 
the lectures on Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens (GA 60) in which the guiding model is the early 
Christian issue of the “conversion” to a whole different dimension of temporality – the time of eternal life 
versus the time of mundane existence – as articulated in the Pauline epistles.  See on this issue Ted 
Kiesel, The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 
176-227. 
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in the Logische Untersuchungen , but continues with the observation that phe-
nomenology is much more than a “technique” (GA 64, p. 18). Rather it requires 
that  
 
The way of investigating (Untersuchungsart) must be prescribed (vorgegeben) by 
the in each case specific things themselves.  The author [i.e. Heidegger] owes his 
understanding of this fact less to that book than to intense personal guidance by 
Husserl himself, who familiarized him with the different content domains 
(Sachgebiete) of phenomenological research through repeated instruction and the 
most generous access to unpublished manuscripts.  (ibid.) 
 
One can well assume that one of the primary manuscripts Heidegger has in 
mind here must include the Ideen II, but explicit confirmation of this can only 
be found in the lecture course Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (GA 
20) from 1925. There, Heidegger cites Scheler and Husserl as building upon 
insights from Dilthey that move the analysis of pure consciousness from a natu-
ralistic to a personalistic perspective and recognize that,  
 
the person finds herself in a specific self-sameness over against the world, which 
actively influences and which reacts back upon her; that in each moment the per-
son as a whole reacts, not just in willing, feeling, and viewing, but simultaneously 
all of those in one;  and that the connected life (Lebenszusammenhang) of the per-
son in each situation is one that is in development (GA 20, p. 164). 
 
Heidegger locates Husserl with the arc laid out by Dilthey and Scheler when 
he calls Husserl’s investigations into the structures of personhood a 
“personalistic psychology” (ibid., p. 167).  Heidegger reports that Husserl’s first 
attempt to work out such a personalistic psychology began with intense work in 
1914/15 that leads to the courses on “Nature and Spirit” that Heidegger men-
tions here (and had recommended earlier to his students in 19195).  More im-
portantly, Heidegger confirms that Husserl had shared the manuscripts from 
the “second part” of the Ideen with him during the winter  of 1924/25 , in light 
of which some of the criticisms to Husserl’s approach to personhood are now “in 
a certain way already somewhat antiquated” (ibid., p. 168), but his final word is 
that still, “he hardly gets further than Dilthey, even though his [i.e., Husserl’s] 
 
 
5 GA 56/57, p. 165. 
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analyses are in particular regards superior to his” (ibid., 173).  Here he proba-
bly referring to the typed manuscript that Landgrebe had just prepared based 
on Edith Stein’s handwritten manuscripts from 1916 and 1918.  However, it is 
possible, and even probable that Heidegger had access to the earlier hand-
written manuscripts since they were one of the few comprehensive sets of 
manuscripts that were available when Heidegger wrote his footnote mentioning 
manuscripts Husserl had lent him in the summer of 1924.  There is no doubt, 
however, that the concepts and the general direction of the analyses later pub-
lished as the Ideen II were familiar to Heidegger soon after he arrived in Frei-
burg, both through conversations and through Husserl’s lectures on  “Natur und 
Geist”.  Since the early manuscripts on which the original research manuscripts 
of the Ideen II were based were composed under the heading of “Natur und 
Geist”, the question is to a certain extent moot.  What is beyond doubt is that 
Heidegger was acquainted with this area of Husserl’s work, found it very prom-
ising and helpful, and incorporated much of what he learned from it into his 
own thinking, but that he ultimately also came to the conclusion that Husserl 
himself remained too much under the sway of the tradition of modern episte-
mology to take full advantage of the possibilities it offered.  In sum, Heidegger 
saw in both books of the Ideen an important point of departure for his own 
work, but one which he saw himself moving beyond already in the early 20’s. 
 
 
2. THE FUNDAMENTAL DIFFERENCE 
 
The previous section described how by 1925 at the latest, Heidegger had 
come to the conclusion that, in spite of Husserl’s contributions to phenomenol-
ogy, his approach still remained too strongly oriented on the model of theoreti-
cal knowledge and a conception of truth that was not adequate to address 
questions about “the truth of art and religion”. He also claimed that Husserl’s 
his approach was not adequate to the primary task of phenonomenology, which 
is “understanding life itself in its authentic Being and responding to the ques-
tion concerning the character of its Being”  (ibid., p. 274-75), life not as an ob-
ject of knowledge , but as something that must be enacted and accomplished.  
The task of this section will be 1) to explain just what Heidegger has in 
mind when he criticizes Husserl’s approach to life and to other issues that he 
believe cannot be addressed adequately using models taken from theoretical 
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knowledge, 2) to identify the genuine points of difference between them, and 
then 3) to examine the phenomenological justification for the different positions 
that each of them occupies with regard to those fundamental issues.  Put very 
briefly, this section of the essay will attempt to show that the basic difference 
consist in their differing views on the possibility of a grounding for ethics, if by 
ethics we mean an inquiry into the nature and foundations for right action.  
Husserl contends that the very nature of reason involves the implicit claim that 
all sorts of position-takings, including decisions about right actions, point to the 
possibility of an intuition, an experience that can confirm or refute the validity 
of that position-taking consistent with the intention/fulfillment structure of con-
sciousness in general. Heidegger by contrast considers this an illusion for the 
basic questions that provide the ultimate grounding for action, and sees this 
view as an illicit reliance on a model taken from theoretical reason.  He con-
tends rather that authentic Dasein recognizes Dasein itself must take on the 
responsibility of providing meaning to a life, but that “no one and nothing” can 
relieve one of the burden of that choice – which is why in authentic Dasein, the 
voice of conscience that calls one to face up to this fact speaks silently because 
it cannot tell you what the right choice is.  The main sources that I will use to 
highlight these differences will be Heidegger’s Being and Time6 and  Husserl’s 
lectures from 1920-24 entitled “Einleitung in die Ethik” (“Introduction to Eth-
ics”), published a few years ago as Volume XXVII of the Husserliana.7  I will 
thereby attempt to demonstrate that the real differences lie not so much in 
what is actually contained in the Ideas I or the Ideas II, but that the most fun-
damental and important difference concerns their views about the ultimate 
grounding of practical life. 
 
 
3. HEIDEGGER ON THE GROUNDLESS GROUND 
 
Reading Being and Time in light of the line of thinking developed in the ear-
ly lectures, it is very clear that when Heidegger criticizes earlier philosophers 
 
 
6 Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag 1972).  All citations will be listed 
according to the page numbers in the Niemeyer edition, which are also listed in the margins of both of 
the published English translations. 
7 Edmund Husserl, Einleitung in die Ethik, Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1920/1925, Husserliana Band 
XXXVII, edited by Henning Peucker, Dordrecht: Kluwer 2004. In this essay, citations from this volume 
will be noted by listing the page number from this volume.   
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for having failed to address the question of the meaning of Being, it is the Being 
not of things that populate the world, but of the world itself, of Dasein that has 
been overlooked from his perspective.  Reading the early lectures in light of the 
much more extensive discussion of death, conscience, resoluteness, and tem-
porality presented in Being and Time allows the reader to see in much greater 
depth what Heidegger was thinking in the much briefer discussions of those 
topics with which he closes the 1925 lectures cited in the other section of this 
paper.  The general direction of the analyses is already apparent in those lec-
tures when he says that “Facing (Vorlaufen) death in each moment 
(Augenblick) of Dasein signifies Dasein’s self-retrieval out of the They (Man) in 
the sense of choosing oneself” (GA 20, 440) and that, “In facing its death, 
Dasein can make itself responsible in an absolute sense” (GA 20, 440-41).  To 
argue that the main topic of Being and Time is the possibility of grounding an 
ethics is at least controversial, and perhaps even provocative, but it is a thesis 
that I will attempt to explain and defend in the following remarks.  It is, how-
ever, not completely new; for instance, Francois Raffoul claimed something 
quite similar at OPO II in Lima and made a good, but slightly different case for 
it compared to the description I will give today. 
In some ways, it is easier to see how the project of Being and Time can ap-
propriately be described as a non-metaphysical grounding of an ethics in light 
of the earlier lectures that provide some of this background to Being and Time.  
In general terms, one can see how the question that later shows up as the 
question of the meaning of Being of beings in general and of Dasein very spe-
cifically and its relationship to originary temporality emerges against the back-
ground of questions into the proper kind life as a practical matter, as a choice 
for which one must take responsibility.  My claim is that in spite of the changes 
in terminology, the same question is still the fundamental issue at stake in Be-
ing and Time. 
Of course, we recall that Heidegger does not begin Being and Time with an 
analysis of Dasein per se. Rather, in the First Division of Being and Time, 
Heidegger introduces the notion of world by way of an analysis of how objects 
within the world show up for us in our daily lives. The fundamental trait that 
this analysis reveals is that it is part of their very nature they have Bewandtnis 
or relevance in some way to us. They are meaningful not in themselves, but in 
reference to what can or cannot be done with them, how they affect us in our 
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daily lives. “Relevance” points in two directions: something (an object within 
the world) is relevant for doing or accomplishing something (an activity). Hence 
“worldhood” is introduced by showing how things we encounter in our daily 
lives are organized around the way they fit into our goals and are well or ill-
suited to helping us accomplish the things we want to do, “possibilities of 
Dasein” he calls them.  “World” then is not a sum of objects within the world or 
a temporal-spatial realm within which objects are located, but a set of possibili-
ties of Dasein that form the backdrop for how objects within the world appear 
for us. 
Moreover, Heidegger also points to the fact that these “possibilities of 
Dasein”, as ways of doing things or reacting to things we encounter in our lives, 
are themselves organized into interrelated “contexts of meaning” 
(Bedeutungszusammenhänge) and that there is a hierarchical relationship be-
tween the levels of meaning, where objects are not only organized according to 
their function as means towards some end that is a possibility of Dasein (ham-
mers for driving in nails, and homes as places to live), but that these possibili-
ties themselves are organized into means/ends relationships (driving in nails to 
make a home, having a home to provide shelter, be a good investment, or im-
press one’s friends) in which every means (ein Wozu), be it an object or an ac-
tivity, points to some other activity (in the broadest sense whereby even having 
things happen to you is an activity, a way of being (“Seinsweise”), or a “possi-
bility of Dasein” that has meaning for us from which it derives the significance it 
has, until ultimately one comes upon some possibility that has meaning in itself 
and for no other purpose outside itself. This is the Worumwillen, the “for-the-
sake-of-which”, what one might call the ultimate end or the highest priority in 
light of which all other things and activities derive the significance that they 
have for Dasein. 
But where does this Worumwillen come from?  What provides the justifica-
tion for it? Heidegger’s analysis of fallenness suggests that in everyday life 
meanings seem just to be there “in” the things within the world or that they are 
social conventions whose substantiality (to use Hegel’s term) consists in the 
fact that they seem as solid and objective as the brilliance or hardness of a di-
amond because there seems to be no one individual to whom they can be 
traced back as their source, and hence no one who could simply revoke them 
and their power if he or she chose to do so. 
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What anxiety, as Heidegger describes it, reveals is that this substantiality is 
an illusion. In anxiety, things lose their meanings, their relevance becomes 
questionable or fades away. If indeed they were as substantial as they other-
wise might seem, this would be impossible. This does not necessarily mean that 
there is not a right or a wrong answer to the question about what really is 
good, and of course it does not mean that it makes no difference which answer 
you choose. As much as anything else within the world, the answer one ac-
cepts, decides who one is and what course one’s life will take. What anxiety 
reveals is that no thing and no one can tell you the answer, can tell you what is 
really important, what the ultimate ends, the highest priorities for a life should 
be. If there were something or someone that could tell you that answer apart 
from a standard one has already accepted, in terms of which something would 
count as the answer, then things would once again regain the meaning that is 
missing in anxiety. But if no one and nothing can, then there is no firm ground 
from which to make a decision, but since each life is always explicitly or implic-
itly guided by some sense of an ultimate end or highest priority for a life, one 
cannot wait around to make a decision until such a firm ground emerges.  
Perhaps there are other modes of access to this insight than the experience 
of anxiety as Heidegger describes it, but even if that is true, the basic point 
stays the same. No thing and no one can tell you what the ultimate norms for a 
life should be – or better put – no one can tell you who to listen to (people try 
to tell us all the time) about the ultimate norms, the highest priorities for a life, 
except in terms of ends or priorities that we have already accepted as valid. If 
those are precisely what are in question, then this is indeed a rather unsettling 
experience, especially if you would like to have something solid and substantial 
to tell you what is and is not good and important, and thereby to provide a reli-
able guide for action. 
In everyday life, it looks like the answer is settled or at least like there is 
some firm ground for settling the issue. I take it that one of the main differ-
ences between authentic and inauthentic being-a-self is that in authentic being-
a-self, one is aware that there is no firm ground outside of oneself to which one 
can appeal to find out what the ultimate end or the highest priority for a life 
should be.  For Heidegger, the question of the good is the question of what is 
important in life. And once again, we recall the already in the First Part, 
Heidegger had suggested that no one (the They) and nothing (no being within 
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the world or any feature of it apart from the relevance we give it in light of the 
significance we attach to the possibilities of Dasein that it furthers or hinders) 
can tell us the answer. In fact, even the call of conscience that Heidegger sees 
as calling one to authentic existence, speaks “silently” for precisely this reason. 
If conscience could tell us the answer, then a force outside of ourselves other 
than Dasein, and not Dasein itself, would be the source of meaning and direc-
tion. 
So if there is an answer, it has to be one for which I am responsible. Even if 
I choose an answer that I take from someone or somewhere else – revealed 
religion, the traditions of my ethnic background or my family, my friends, my 
teachers –, then it is I who have done so and no one else. The fact that I am 
the one who accepts this answer that sets the overall priorities in my life and 
has a certain view about the significance of events and things within the world 
for me, Heidegger terms – I don’t think, inappropriately – “freedom”. (SuZ 266, 
cf. WdGr 51), moreover not just freedom in general, but “freedom towards 
death”. 
Why does he call it “freedom towards death”? I would like to suggest that 
this is intimately connected with the way that Dasein is the ground of its choic-
es through the adoption of a Worumwillen that, precisely because it is ultimate, 
cannot be grounded in anything else. It is freedom, among other things, be-
cause it involves a choice and because no one and nothing can determine this 
choice for Dasein. It is appropriately called “freedom” because it is about a 
choice, and it is about a choice that is not determined outside of Dasein. It does 
indeed have ontological significance because it sets the context against which 
things can show up as the kinds of things they are, but since what it above all 
concerns is the “Worumwillen” of a life that is Dasein’s own, this is not a matter 
of theoretical classification as much as it is about what things matter and what 
things don’t, and how they matter – whether they are to be embraced or avoid-
ed, valued or shunned. And it not only has practical implications, but if this is 
right, it is this primary or original choice that determines what one should and 
must do. If the examples of “ways to be” are taken simply from the everyday 
activities of Dasein, then the kind of practical concerns one is describing are 
things like “building a house” or “being a chemist” whose value is presupposed, 
and the predicates for objects within the world are simply utility-characteristics. 
But if, in authentic Dasein, what one realizes is that the question is what gives 
202 THOMAS NENON 
 
 202 Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, vol. Monográfico 4/II (2013): Razón y Vida. 
 
meaning to a life, then the question goes far beyond utility and what is up for 
debate is not just how best to accomplish a given aim, but rather what the 
proper aim for a life in general is. 
To say that it is “freedom towards death” is another way of stating what he 
calls in WdGr the “finitude” of human freedom. In that essay, the finitude is 
connected with the fact that  freedom is something that “happens to us”, and 
that our choices are “finite”.  This explains why he says that freedom is not only 
the “ground”, but also the “Ab-grund” (“abyss”) of Dasein, that it is the 
“Ohnmacht” (powerlessness) because it is not in Dasein’s control whether this 
originary event occurs.  Dasein projects (entwirft), en-visages a Worumwillen, 
but it does so as thrown, which is the first limitation.  Dasein does not get to 
decide its starting point or its circumstances.  For instance, I did not choose to 
be born into a modern technological age any more than ancient Greeks chose 
not to, but our possibilities are very different nonetheless and both of us must 
still make choices about the ultimate priorities for our lives within each of those 
different contexts. Moreover, Dasein is also not free not to choose, Dasein does 
not get to decide whether to set a highest priority for itself or not; moreover, at 
any point where the moment of authentic decision arrives, Dasein discovers 
that it has already been making this basic decision all along whether it knew it 
or not. In Being and Time, the finitude that I am or rather enact at each mo-
ment (what he calls “being-towards-the-end” or “constantly dying”), is brought 
out by such phrases as the “impossibility of Dasein”, or my being “das 
(nichtige) Grund-sein einer Nichtigkeit” (SuZ 285). And finally, setting an end 
or a goal for a life does not necessarily mean one will achieve that goal.   
Heidegger stresses that Dasein never has complete control over its exist-
ence, making clear that even authentic Dasein is not synonymous with a kind of 
self-consciousness that is completely autonomous and transparent to itself. It is 
not a subject conceived of in the modern sense. Rather human life as Dasein is 
always the choice about priorities that it does not make all on its own, but ra-
ther “adopts”, “appropriates”, “takes on”. Moreover, it is also limited through 
the fact that the choice, as a genuine choice, means that to choose it involves 
failing to choose another. If I set financial success as my highest goal, I have 
not made having time for my family, pursuing knowledge for its own sake, or 
sense pleasures my highest goal. If I adopt one of the others as my highest 
goal, then I have not chosen financial success as my highest priority and there-
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by make it much less likely that I will actually achieve it. If I choose a balance 
of financial success, professional satisfaction, and contributions to my family 
and my community as my highest priority, I am likely to be less successful at 
any one of them than I would be if I made that my exclusive priority.  “Free-
dom however exists only in the choice of the one, that means in bearing the 
not-having chosen, and not-having-been-able-to-choose the other”. (285) The 
finitude of freedom also means that fallenness is not an accident because to live 
is to act in a concrete setting that involves interaction with things in the world 
(that are not under my complete control) and other people. It involves not just 
holding possibilities open as such, but also necessarily seizing one of them not 
just as a possibility but as the actual priority that guides my actions and my 
refraining from acting and thereby becomes part of something concrete as well 
– or if I fail to do so, then the abstract choice of holding open possibilities is my 
highest priority, whose choice prevents me from seizing upon any one of them, 
and this is in itself a concrete course of action or “inaction” that I have chosen. 
Is there any way of knowing what will happen if I make one sort of life my 
ultimate priority instead of another.  For Heidegger, the answer is no.  Is there 
someone who can tell me the answer?  Again, the answer is no.  It is some-
thing for which each individual must take responsibility.  And are there any 
facts in the world that can tell me what matters, what makes a life meaningful?  
This is for Heidegger, the most important question and what we have been 
suggesting is that the answer here is once again no, but that the decision about 
what is to count as significant is the most important question there is and that 
it is the ground of all other significance and relevance of events and things that 
happen in the world, which is to say within one’s life.  That is why I have been 
arguing that for Heidegger the most important question in ethics is one that 
one can only face authentically when one recognizes that Dasein is the ground-
less ground of all meaning in the world and that what counts as right and 
wrong is decided by Dasein’s resolute commitment (he calls it a “projection”) to 
the goodness of a specific form of life that it recognizes is just one possibility 
among many.  This is then anything but a theoretical question and there is no 
“fact”, nothing that theoretical reason or anything like it can contribute to the 
solution or grounding of the answer to this question. 
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4. HUSSERL ON THE ULTIMATE GROUNDS OF ETHICS 
 
Husserl’s project in his “Introduction to Ethics” lectures from 1920 and 
1924 – i.e. during the very time when Heidegger’s early lectures are being 
composed – is to show how moral and ethical reasoning function in ways that 
parallel theoretical reason.  The general program of a Husserlian ethics could 
hence be described as the programmatic attempt to show that there are struc-
tures of reason within the practical and axiological spheres that are analogous 
to those of within the sphere of theoretical reason, and he even provides a rela-
tively specific example of this parallel in a passage from the lectures “Introduc-
tion to Ethics” that deserves to be quoted in its entirety:  
 
Indeed we have spoken repeatedly about a distinction within the sphere of emo-
tional acts that we called evaluative acts of feeling that precisely parallels the dis-
tinction between judgments of opinion and judgments based on insight that are 
grasped as the truth. We just need to emphasize that these are not passive 
graspings of value, but rather acts that have been performed by the I. We can say 
that the so-called grasping of value, of which it is said that it is a loving grasping of 
value, in which the value itself is comprehended and possessed is the originary ac-
quisition through a conscious act as opposed to a mere opining its value, this I’s act 
of loving, looking forward to something etc. that just opines it as something to look 
forward to, considers it lovable, but has not appropriated the value in an originary 
way and in itself – or in the opposite case, has experienced a rejection, a disap-
pointment when the I in the attempt at originary appropriation experiences that the 
thing that was valued is in truth not something pleasant, that the thing that was 
considered beautiful is a piece of awful kitsch, etc.: in the same way in the sphere 
of willing, there is a new kind of motivating acts for practical decisions just as there 
are for acts of believing and in acts of valuing”. (120) 
 
“Reason“ in the practical sphere is not, therefore, a matter of theoretical 
calculation or of the intellect alone. It is the self’s directedness towards appro-
priate experiences and intuitions that can serve as confirmation for the pur-
portedly beautiful or valuable in the aesthetic or the good in the ethical sphere. 
It is also clear how reason is not the opposite of feelings. Rather it is the search 
for appropriate feelings and dispositions for acting. For Husserl, not all feelings 
are created equal and not every feeling is sui generis pathological in a Kantian 
sense.  For him, the question is not how to have pure practical reason trump all 
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of our inclinations, but rather how to sort out the appropriate from inappropri-
ate inclinations.  In fact, Husserl believes that all actions are motivated by feel-
ings: „Mere understanding is not practical.  Only feelings can determine ac-
tions”, (170)  and further,  
 
Human beings’ practical conduct is manifestly determined by feeling.  If we at-
tempted to extinguish all feeling from the human breast, then concepts such as end 
and means, good and bad, virtue and vice and all of the concepts that belong to 
them would lose their meaning.  Human beings would not then be striving, willing, 
acting beings anymore.  We must then have recourse to feeling and more precisely 
investigate them, in order to be able to clarify the sense of ethical concepts and to 
study human beings as ethical beings, to clarify the uniqueness of their moral con-
duct, and to provide a grounding for the ethical laws that explain it. (148)  
 
Even Kant recognizes that feelings must play a central role in ethical life 
when he acknowledges that the awareness of the obligatory character of the 
moral law gives rise to the feeling of respect that motivates a person to act in a 
manner consistent with the law, but Husserl wants to recognize a much wider 
range of acceptable feelings as appropriate motivating factors for rational 
agents. He mentions approval and disapproval, but also love – love of oneself 
and love of others – and “Seligkeit”, two concepts that he adopts from Fichte, 
and some of his other examples seem to point to feelings such as pride, a 
sense of accomplishment, and others that could be legitimate reasons to act 
ethically as well. 
Even though Husserl disagrees with Kant on the role and range of feelings 
in ethical decision-making, he does agree with him on one point, namely that 
fundamental concept of an ethical life as rational is duty, and that duty involves 
the decision-making that any rational agent should in principle be able to ac-
cept as appropriate in these specific circumstances. Husserl is not a formalist, 
among other things because he does believe that the specific circumstances 
and limitations matter in ethical decision-making, but he does believe that it is 
inconsistent with morality for an agent to place a higher priority on his or her 
own specific ends or perspective than to those of other rational agents. Here 
again he sees a parallel with theoretical truths. People often disagree even 
about fairly basic matters of fact and often have their own individual views 
about them, but from Husserl’s perspective that does not mean that they are all 
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correct or that none of them are. So too in the moral realm the idea of a moral 
ought or duty means 
 
that every moral judgment does not merely express a subjective feeling and not 
even just the general fact that every normal human beings in fact tends to feel and 
act this way, but rather that according to its very sense contains the claim that the 
particular practical conduct is correct or incorrect ... Moral truth includes just as 
every mathematical and every other judgment the sense that whoever decides this 
way, morally, mathematically or any other way, decides correctly, just as falsehood 
includes the sense that whoever decides this way decides incorrectly, in a way that 
is to be condemned (149) 
 
He stresses a couple of pages later that there are also some significant dif-
ferences between mathematical and practical truths. For instance, mathemati-
cal truths do not express norms as practical truths do. However, he does agree 
that the very nature of practical reason itself dictates that everyone should rec-
ognize the truth of some basic practical principles such as the principle of love 
of neighbor (Nächstenliebe) that follows from the nature of reason itself as uni-
versal and establishes an affinity to Kant’s categorical imperative, in spite of 
Husserl’s reservations about Kant’s “formalism” and his refusal to recognize 
moral differences among the very different kinds of feelings that can legitimate-
ly motivation ethical decisions beyond mere respect for the moral law. He 
agrees with Kant about the universal responsibility of all human beings to rec-
ognize these principles when he says that even the moral sinner can recognize 
the sin and know what should have been done. 
The parallels between the theoretical and practical reason for Husserl then 
are explicit and very clear.  Just as within the theoretical sphere, for Husserl 
reason is universal. In a negative sense, this means that anything that could 
not in general be compatible with the willing of other free beings is ruled out.  
Positively speaking, it means that any reasonable person should be able to 
agree with the rightness of practical decisions under similar circumstance. Cir-
cumstances matter for Husserl, including one’s historical and cultural settings 
against which authentically egoic acts are undertaken, including acts of valuing 
and willing, so different persons will reasonably choose differently, what makes 
the decision or act right in a given setting is not something that the individual 
decides but rather discovers.  It is something about which the person can be 
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right or wrong and that the further course of experience or perhaps reflection 
or discussions with others can confirm or disconfirm. Although it is not theoreti-
cal insights guiding practical actions alone or even primarily, the structure of 
intention and fulfillment that Husserl identifies with the sphere of theoretical 
reason as the rational ground of theoretical judgments has parallels in notions 
of right valuing and right action that find confirmation or disconfirmation 
through the further course of experience as well.   
 
 
5. THE QUESTION ITSELF: GROUNDING ULTIMATE GROUNDS? 
 
We recall Heidegger’s frequent comments described in the first section 
about the extent to which both he and Husserl share much are common in their 
investigations. Both are working within the general framework of transcenden-
tal phenomenology according to which objects (along with events and actions) 
present themselves to us in various ways according to the meanings that they 
have for us.  Both begin with an analysis of our everyday experience of things 
instead of adopting assumptions about objects and their properties from the 
natural sciences, maintaining rather that the natural sciences are abstractions 
from and derivative of the experience of things in our daily lives.  Moreover, for 
both it is also clear that for both of them, our primary access to objects within 
the world in our daily lives is not primarily in terms of their mere perceptual 
features at all but rather in terms of the values and uses they have for us. Both 
recognize that these common meanings are at first taken from a shared back-
ground of understanding that has both a historical and a social dimension.  For 
Heidegger, these issues addressed in his descriptions of Befindlichkeit or 
Geworfenheit and of the “They” (“das Man”) of the self in everyday life.  For 
Husserl, they are described in genetic accounts of the establishment of 
sedimented tendencies in believing, valuing, and willing throughout the course 
of a life and in his descriptions of the Umwelt as originally social in the Ideas II.  
It is also true that both Husserl and Heidegger believe that what Husserl calls 
persons, beings who have as their form of being that Heidegger calls Dasein, 
possess the ability and even the responsibility to move beyond these 
sedimented histories and shared assumptions about what is true, valuable, and 
good through what Husserl calls authentically egoic acts or what Heidegger calls 
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authentic existence.  Hence for both of them, the question about the ultimate 
grounds of practice and values are at the heart of the philosophical concerns as 
of the early ‘20s at the latest.  What are the standards to be applied when one 
is asking about what is truly good?   
This essay has attempted to show that Heidegger correctly identifies a fun-
damental and important point of difference between them.  When he argues 
that Husserl is too much oriented on the model of the science and the theoreti-
cal realm that cannot appropriately deal with questions about the truth of art 
and religion, I am suggesting that what is really at issue is the question about 
the ultimate principles for practice, action and whether they can be justified in 
ways that parallel justification of theoretical beliefs or not.  Heidegger thinks 
not; Husserl believes that they must be. For Husserl, responsibility involves 
critical reflection and submission to the constraints of practical reason through 
respect for universality and the constant reexamination of sedimented values 
and tendencies to action through the confirmation that appropriate kinds of ex-
periences, intuitions provide. For Heidegger, responsibility means recognizing 
that these are fundamental choices for which no one and nothing else can pro-
vide justification, that these choices must be resolutely faced as “projections” of 
Dasein.  This is what authentic futuricity entails and why he calls this originary 
temporality. 
Heidegger not only notes the differences, but claims that Husserl is mistak-
en.  Is there a way to decide?  In the concluding section of this essay, I would 
like to think about our experience of accepting ultimate priorities for life and 
see if we cannot find examples that might lead each of them to the insights 
that they articulate and at the same time illustrate the problematic character of 
both of the alternatives as they describe them.  In Plato, the common examples 
we find are the lives guided by their appetitites, those guided by a sense of 
honor, and those guided by the search for truth, the philosophers.  Some con-
temporary examples might be those with the highest priority being physical 
fitness and attractiveness, those whose highest priority is financial success, and 
those interested in learning and education.  Most of the readers of this article 
will belong to the third group.  If you picked academic philosophy as your pro-
fession, it is clear that financial success was not your highest priority.  Some 
academics and some people with a great deal of money and leisure time might 
spend much of their time and efforts on physical fitness and attractiveness, but 
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a glance around the room at most philosophy conferences suggests that most 
do not.  What is it that one of the three groups would tell the others that would 
make them come that the life that the others have chosen was inferior?  My 
own experience suggests that the only things one could point to would be per-
suasive only if the audience already valued those features of a life.  Academics 
might point to the relative autonomy of academic life or the joy of continued 
learning.  To the extent that members of the other groups find these things 
attractive and important, this might help convince them of some of the virtues 
of academic life, but unless these are higher priorities for them than physical 
fitness or financial success, they are unlikely to have a significant effect on 
those other persons’ highest priorities.  To put it a different way: I think that 
Heidegger is correct in recognizing that there is no fact that by itself can show 
something is valuable or good without some other prior commitment to the 
goodness or value of something that this instantiates or fosters.  Or to put it in 
philosophers’ talk:  you cannot derive an ought from an is without some implicit 
attachment to another ought.  I think this is the phenomenon that Heidegger 
captures when he claims that “no one and no thing within the world” can tell us 
what are the correct priorities for a life.  That is why I have over the course of 
the last few years during which I have had many more interactions with per-
sons who have not chosen academia as a profession that there really is nothing 
that I can say that will make them come to believe that my priorities are the 
right ones and theirs the wrong ones; and vice-versa.  So the notion of some 
standard or experience that could demand universal agreement about priorities 
seems mistaken to me.  Perhaps that is one reason why, except for formal 
principles such respect for other persons, Husserl himself fails to provide a 
normative ethics, and that where he does move in that direction by praising the 
virtues of the arts or learning over other more “base” activities, the case he 
makes for them seems to represent much more the consensus of a specific so-
ciety (German) at a specific time (end of the 19th, beginning of the 20th centu-
ry) than a universal principle.  At the same time, however, I do think that Hus-
serl is correct when he emphasizes that we do not believe something is prefer-
able because we prefer it, but that we prefer something because we find it 
preferable.  I think it belongs to the phenomenon of seeing something as good 
or valuable that we sense ourselves as recognizing, not making it.  I think that 
I recognize something about the goodness of continuing learning that I think 
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other people miss.  They are sure that they are recognizing something about 
just how important and good physical fitness or wealth that I am missing.  We 
have different priorities because we see things differently.  This is I think what 
Husserl means when he says that recognizing values and goods are “intuitions”.  
What I am less sure about for these ultimate priorities is what would count as 
“disconfirmation” or “disappointment”.  The obvious candidates for such exam-
ples fail, in my view.  Someone might aspire to the academic life and seek a 
position in academic philosophy because they are convinced that it is a domain 
filled with persons devoted as they are to truth and the dissemination of learn-
ing.  After a few years in a dysfunctional department or after several experi-
ences with colleagues or administrators interested much more in self-
aggrandizement or power than in education and learning, they might decide 
that their decision was a mistake.  That would fit the description of an experi-
ence of disappointment that would be consistent with Husserl’s claim that I can 
be mistaken about the value or goodness of something, namely a career in ac-
ademia, but I do not think that this is a case where one becomes convinced 
that one’s ultimate ends or priorities in life are mistaken – just one in which one 
learns that the means one pursued to achieve those ends was mistaken or at 
least less suited to them than one had expected.  Perhaps there is another kind 
of example that really does have to do with the ends themselves.  Think of the 
case where a young man was sure that life-long learning and education were 
goals worthy of a life’s devotion, but later comes to wonder in light of the hard-
ships and frustrations he experiences along the way.  Maybe he then begins to 
reconsider whether he really is so committed to this goal that it is worth sacri-
ficing financial opportunities he might otherwise have.  This seems to be a case 
where the experience of the life as a whole, not just as an envisaged end in the 
abstract, but a very concrete goal with that no longer seems so attractive.  It is 
not any one thing that causes this change of heart, but the experience of all the 
things that happen along the way.  This seems more consistent with Husserl’s 
than Heidegger account.  Nonetheless, it is still true that what must be decided 
is not just whether a specific goal can be achieved or not, but what one’s genu-
ine priorities are now in light of all that one has learned and that is a different 
matter. This is not inconsistent with either Heidegger’s or Husserl’s account. So 
in the end, I am agreeing with Heidegger about the fact that ultimate ends are 
foundational in a way that places them outside the usual schema of confirma-
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tion/disconfirmation that Husserl claims hold for the sphere of ethics and ethical 
principles as well, but I disagree with him that these are mere “projections” 
instead of what seem to be insights.  The fact that not all people share these 
insights does not make them seem less compelling for the person who has 
them.  I would argue that these kinds of insights resemble theoretical insights 
to the extent that the act of seeing, the noesis, – in this case the recognition of 
the valuable and the good –, is directed to what is seen, the noema – in this 
case the truly valuable and the good.  We prefer this over that because we real-
ly do think it is more valuable and better – a fundamentally Platonic position 
perhaps.  But whereas Plato could claim that the recognition of the good is a 
kind of theorein because there is something to be seen there, it is hard to think 
of an example of confirmation or disconfirmation for ultimate ends that is akin 
to that of theoretical intentions if these ultimate ends are, to use Heidegger’s 
language, not anything that resides within the world, but rather constitutes the 
meaningfulness of the world as such.  
 
